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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 950736-CA

vs.

:

MICHAEL PATEFIELD,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure because the sentencing of Mr. Patefield on November 2, 1995 is
considered to be the final decision of the District Court. See also Utah Code § 78-2a-3 (2)(f).
The notice of appeal was filed on November 2, 1995, within 30 days of the entry of
judgement. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4{a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this appeal
is timely.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE.
Mr. Patefield appeals from his conviction following the entry of his conditional pleas of
guilty to the Information charging him with two counts of Possession of a Controlled
Substance in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-2 (2){a)(i) and Possession of Paraphernalia in
violation of § 58-37a-5. Specifically, Mr. Patefield challenges the District Court's denial of his
motion to suppress evidence.

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,
1. On May 1, 1995, Mr. Patefield was charged in an Information with
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a "3rd" degree Felony, in violation of a Utah Code §
58-37-8 (2){a}(i); Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class HBM misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code § 58-37-8 (2}(a)(i) and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class UB* misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code § 58-37a-5.
2. On May 1, 1995, Mr. Patefield was arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty to all
counts of the Information.
3. On August 3, 1995, Mr. Patefield filed a motion to suppress evidence, A copy of
that motion is contained in Addendum B.
4. On September 5, 1995, an evidentiary hearing was held on Mr. Patefield's motion
to suppress evidence. On the same day, the motion to suppress evidence was denied and
Mr. Patefield entered conditional pleas of guilty to all counts of the Information.
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
The sentencing was held on November 2,1995. At that time, the District Court
imposed the following sentence: 0-5 years on count one, 6 months on count 2 and 6 months
on count 3, to run concurrently. The sentence was suspended and Mr. Patefield was placed
on probation, fined $1480.00, ordered to undergo rehabilitative treatment at his expense, and
4 days in county jail with credit for time served. The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on
November 2, 1995.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether Trooper Eldridge exceeded the scope and the detention of
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the stop; and
2. Whether Trooper Eldridge had sufficient probable cause to justify the warrantless
search of the vehicle;
Legal determinations regarding reasonable suspicion are mixed questions of law and
fact. Both the legal conclusions and the underlying findings of fact are reviewed for
correctness, with the Appellate Court affording a measure of discretion to the trial court, with
respect to the findings of fact. State v. Chapman.

P.2d

, 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 6

(Utah 1995); and State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 {Utah 1994).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Patefield was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree
Felony, in violation of a Utah Code § 58-37-8 (2){a)(i); Possession of a Controlled Substance,
a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8 (2){a){i) and Possession of
Paraphernalia, a class MBM misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37a-5.
On September 5, 1995, a hearing was held on Mr. Patefield's motion to suppress
evidence seized in connection with this matter. At the hearing, Trooper Rick Eldridge testified
that he was on duty the 28th day of April, 1995. (T 4) While driving on SR-191, Trooper
Eldridge observed a older model Volkswagen Van with faulty equipment, namely, a burned out
license plate. {T 4-5) Trooper Eldridge followed the vehicle for approximately one mile before
stopping it. (T 20) The trooper testified that all he intended to do was to give the driver a
verbal warning. (T 16)
Trooper Eldridge approached the vehicle, noting the presence of two occupants and a
dog. (T 4) The trooper advised the driver, Mr. Patefield, of the equipment violation. (T 5)
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Mr. Patefield replied that he thought that the light had been fixed but that he would fix it again
and he asked if he could get out of the van and check the light. {T 5) Trooper Eldridge
"allowed* Mr. Patefield to get out of the van. (T 5)
As Mr. Patefield exited the van, Trooper Eldridge followed him to the back of the
vehicle. (T 5} Mr. Patefield attempted to fix the light and when he could not, he went to the
side of the van to get some tools. {T 6) Trooper Eldridge followed him. (T 6) When they
were at the side of the van, Trooper Eldridge testified that he could smell the odor of alcohol
on Mr. Patefield's breath. (T 7) Trooper Eldridge further testified that other than the odor of
alcohol, Mr. Patefield did not exhibit any other symptoms consistent with being impaired. (T
19-20) The District Court found no evidence of impairment. {T 39)
As Mr. Patefield leaned into the van and started to get his tools out of a toolbox,
Trooper Eldridge looked into the van and saw "lots of backpacks and coolers, clothes and
whatnot." (T 7) The trooper also noticed several 12-packs of beer, one of which was open
with approximately one-half of the containers missing. {T 6) Trooper Eldridge began
questioning Mr. Patefield about the odor of alcohol and the presence of open containers in the
van. (T 7) Mr. Patefield replied that he had a beer for dinner, that he had not been drinking
in the vehicle and that there were no open containers. (T 7) Trooper Eldridge then replied
that he wanted to check the van so as to assure himself that there were no open containers
{T 7) Mr. Willey exited the van and took the dog. (T 7) Trooper Eldridge began to search t; a
vehicle. At one point during the search, Trooper Eldridge testified that he smelled the odor of
burnt marijyana emanating from a fanny pack. (T 7) When he questioned Mr. Patefield about
this, Mr. Patefield opened the fanny pack and handed the trooper a marijuana pipe. {T 8)
The ensuing search revealed further controlled substances and paraphernalia. (T 10-11) Mr.
4

Patefield was placed under arrest. (T 12)
Mr. Patefield filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence gathered at the time of the
stop. The District Court denied the motion. That same day Mr. Patefield entered conditional
pleas of guilty to all counts. Mr. Patefield was sentenced and this appeal follows.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court incorrectly concluded that there was a consensual encounter after the
trooper had warned the driver about the faulty equipment violation. The trooper never gave
any indication that the occupants were free to leave. Controlling case law mandated that
once the trooper completed the reason for the stop, the occupants must be allowed to
proceed on their way, without further detention. If the seizure had been strictly tied to the
purpose of the traffic stop, the trooper would have allowed them on their way once he had
given the warning about the faulty equipment.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that there was probable cause which justified the
warrantless search of the vehicle. The facts known to the trooper, the missing containers out
of one open 12-pack of beer and the smell of alcohol on the driver's breath who was
determined not to be impaired, did not rise to level of probable cause.
ARGUMENT
1. Trooper Eldridqe Exceeded the Scope and the Detention of the Stop.
In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court articulated a
two prong test to determine whether a routine traffic stop can withstand constitutional scrunity:
(1) Was the police officer's action
"justified at its inception"?
(2) Was the resulting detention
"reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the
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interference in the first place"?
(citation omitted).
JsL 873 P.2d at 1131-32.
In the case at hand, it is conceded that the trooper was justified in stopping the vehicle
due to the faulty equipment violation. Since the stop itself is not challenged, two of the
questions before this Court involve the second prong of the test: Specifically, at what point
did the trooper exceed the scope of the stop and when the detention "lasted longer than
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop". State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990), disagreed with on other grounds. Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1134 n.3. As a matter of
common sense it would appear that the illegality began after the officer had given the driver
the warning about the faulty equipment
Once a traffic stop is made the
detention 'must be temporary and last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop". Both the
"length and [the] scope of the detention
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by1
the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible."
Lopez. 873 P.2d at 135. (citations omitted).
Here, the trooper testified that he only intended to warn the driver and after he did so,
the trooper should have terminated the encounter or, at the very least, indicated that they
were free to leave. Instead, the trooper stayed and created the appearance of a continued
detention and investigation. This is underscored by the trooper's statement that after he told
the driver about the equipment violation, he then "allowed" the driver to get out of his vehicle.
Furthermore, the trooper shadowed Mr. Patefield as he attempted to fix the license plate light
and get tools. Certainly a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or ignore the
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trooper's presence:
Once a person is seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the seizure does
not cease simply because the police
formulate an uncommunicated intention
that the seized person may go on his
or her way. For the seizure to end,
it must be clear to the seized person,
either from the words of the officer
or the clear import of the circumstances,
that the person is at liberty to go about
his or her business.
State v. Higqens, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted.)
Thus, the District Court incorrectly concluded that the encounter with Trooper Eldridge
was a consensual encounter. It is well established that once the reason for the stop is
completed, the occupants must be allowed to proceed on their way, without further detention.
In State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct App. 1992), a deputy observed
defendant's vehicle drift into the emergency lane two separate times. ]d. at 653. Suspecting
that the driver was intoxicated, the deputy pulled the vehicle over. After approaching the
occupants, the deputy concluded that the defendants were not intoxicated. The facts set forth
to justify exceeding the scope were as follows: the driver was visibly nervous when he
handed the deputy his driver's license, the occupant did not have a driver's license, neither
one of the occupants were the registered owner of the car, and the deputy noted that the
route that they were driving was not the most direct route for their claimed destination. Id, at
654. The deputy ran an NCIC check on the driver's identification and the check proved to be
negative. The deputy then asked if there were any firearms, contraband, or alcohol in the
vehicle. One of the occupants replied, "No, but if you'd like to check, go ahead". The ensuing
search revealed four kilograms of cocaine. Jd. at 654-655. This Court held that there were no
7

facts supporting a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion which would, in turn, justify the
detention after the deputy concluded that the occupants were not intoxicated.
Likewise, in State v. Robinson, supra, this Court held that after the purpose of a traffic
stop had been completed, n[a]ny further temporary detention for investigative questioning . . .
is justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion
of serious criminal activity. Robinson. 797 P.2d at 435.
There, the driver made an abrupt traffic lane change in front of the trooper's vehicle
which almost resulted in a collision, jd, at 433. After giving the driver a warning for the illegal
lane change, the following factors were set forth to justify the continued detention: one of the
defendants (Towers) appeared to be nervous and failed to make eye contact whereas the
other (Robinson) was talkative and evasive about questions concerning the van; the officers
observed a homemade bed in the back of the van, there was no cold weather gear despite
the fact that the defendants stated that they were going to Wyoming, the defendants failed to
produce written permission to use the vehicle and the troopers were unable to reach the
owner of the van to confirm the permissive use of the vehicle, jd^ at 435-36.
This Court held that such factors did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion:
In sum, we conclude that the trial
court clearly erred in its findings that
the troopers had the reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity necessary to justify
theiY continued detention and questioning
of Robinson and Towers once the warning
citation had been given and the purposes
of the initial stop had been accomplished.
Defendants* detention after that point was,
therefore, a violation of their fourth
amendment rights.
JfiL at 436-37.
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Godina-Luna. Robinson, and Lopez as well as other appellate cases compel a finding
by this Court that the trooper unreasonably detained Mr. Patefield and his companion after the
stop. To justify the detention, the trooper "'must point to specific, articulable facts, which
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to
conclude defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime,M. State v. Carner. 812
P.2d 460, 466 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied. 836 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1992)(quoting State v.
Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
Therefore, the unlawful detention in this case began, most conservatively, at the point
when the trooper gave the verbal warning and did not allow the occupants to proceed on their
way. Accordingly, the seizure was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. AH evidence seized
as the fruit of the unlawful continued detention must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United
States. 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 LEd.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez.
817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).
2. Trooper Eldrldqe Did Not Have Probable Cause to Justify an Warrantless Search of
the Automobile.
It is well established that a warrantless search of an automobile is per sa unreasonable
absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 470
(Utah 1990).
In this case, the trooper articulated the following facts as providing probable cause for
the warrantless search of the van: the odor of alcohol on the breath of an person who was
not impaired and the presence of several 12-packs, one of which was open, with one-half of
the containers missing.
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Trooper Eldridge lacked the specific information ten justify a warrantless search.
Robinson. 791 P.2d at 436. It is not illegal to drink and tfteen drive unless one's driving skills
are impaired or their blood-alcohol content is .08. Nor is irt illegal to transport closed
containers in a vehicle. That one of the cartons was open, with one-half of the containers
missing does not mean that the beverages were consumed in the vehicle. There are no other
factors which would support this suspicion, such as the odor of alcohol emanating from the
vehicle or the presence of bottle caps. Indeed, the missing containers suggests that the
beverages had been consumed at a different time. It is cfiear that Mr. Patefield had not
recently consumed all the beer that was missing since he was not intoxicated and it is
disingenuous to suggest that he drank only one in the vehicle and the others elsewhere.
Moreover, Hie open 12-pack with missing containers is consistent with innocent activity and
therefore (foes not support reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. See Reid v.
Georgia. 488 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct 2752, 65 LEd.2d 890, 894 (1981)(Held that law
enforcement could not base reasonable suspicion on factors which "describe a very large
category of presumably innocent travelers'); Robinson. 791 P.2d at 436 (same).
Secondly, the trooper was not confronted with exigent circumstances. The State failed
to produce evidence that the means necessary for securing a search warrant were unavailable
to the trooper. The availability of a telephonic search warrant is one factor in determining the
existence of exigent circumstances. State v. Morck. 821 P.2d 1190, 1194, n. 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). There was no indication that the vehicle would be unavailable for a search should the
trooper have to wait for a search warrant. Larocco. at 470. Indeed, the trooper had the
authority to hold the vehicle pending the arrival of a warrant. See Arkansas v. Sanders. 442
U.S. 752, 99 S.Ct. 2586,, 61 LEd.2d 235 (1979). The search in the absence of exigent
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circumstances, therefore, constitutes an unreasonable search under Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution. Larocco. at 471. Accordingly, all evidence seized as the fruit of the
unlawful search must be suppressed, Wono Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833
S.Ct 407, 417-18, 9 LEd.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the
motion to suppress evidence.
DATED this 18th day of January, 1996.
ResjJ^lfbilly submitted:

/

/ji
*$ALIE REILLY
(orney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to Jan Graham, Office of the Attorney General,
Appellate Division,, 236 South Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and hand-delivered to the
Office of the San Juan County Attorney, at 297 South Main in Monticello, Utah on this 18th
day of January, 1996.

REILLY
for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

DETERMINATIVE CONSTfTUrtONAL PROVISIONS
A. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
U.S. Const, amend. IV
B. UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
Utah Const, article 1, section 14
UTAH CODE
A. UTAH CODE 8 58-37-8 I2)(a)(i):
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance,
unless it was obtained from a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting
in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection.
B. UTAH CODE S 58-37a-5 (1):
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert,
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest,
inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
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SEVEN! H DiSI riiCT COURT
San Juan County

Rosalie Reilly #6637
148 South Main #9
Post Office Box 404
Monticello, Utah 84535
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CLERK OF THE COURT

BY.

Deputy

Attorney for Defendant
MICHAEL PATEFIELD
IN AND FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
*
*
*

vs.
MICHAEL PATEFIELD,
Defendant.
TO:

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE; NOTICE OF
HEARING
Case No, 9517-75
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

*

SAN JUAN COUNTY ATTORNEY CRAIG HALLS:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 5th day of September, 1995, at

1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the
courtroom of the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge,
defendant,

Michael

Patefield,

will

bring

on

for hearing

the

following motion:
MOTION
Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Defendant, Michael

Patefield,

by

and through

his

attorney

of

record, Rosalie Reilly, hereby moves this Court for an Order to
suppress all evidence and statements obtained in violation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and

Article I, Sections 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, to wit:
1.

The observations of any police officer after the initial

automobile stop, including, but not limited to, the observations
made during the search of the vehicle, and/or of his person;

See

2.

Any statements attributed to Defendant; and

3.

All tangible evidence seized as the result of the search.

State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).
DATED this 3 / ^

day of August, 1995
Respectfully submitted,

TKJSALIE REILLY
^Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Craig Halls^-at the Public Safety Building
located at 297 South Main, in Mp^tidello, Utah, on this 3 / ^
day
of August, 1995.
/
///
pSALIE REILLY
ttorney for Defendant

